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This topic has been the subject of many cases, articles, re­
views, and treatises due to the broad scope of substantive law, 
sociology, criminology and civil rights involved in its discussion.
The word “obscenity” has many connotations and is most 
vulnerable to subjective interpretation. This element of subjec­
tivity is unfortunately not restricted to the layman’s discussion, 
for judicial subjectivity is still the key to today’s codified definition 
of the word.
An important aspect of all laws is that they should provide 
some guidance for social conduct, but when the judiciary is un­
certain as to the standard of conduct acceptable under the ob­
scenity sections of our Criminal Code, the predictive element be­
comes only a theoretical ideal.
This topic will be examined both as to the substantive law, 
through a historical development, and the sociological evaluation 
of whether these “morality sections” should be included in a crim­
inal statute. Presumably all sections in our Criminal Code have a 
purpose which is met by the proper regulation and enforcement 
thereof. The effecting of the purpose of S. 159 (8) of the Criminal 
Code will be examined in this paper.
This examination is divided into three sections, two of which 
develop and evaluate the substantive law while the concluding 
section deals with the merits of imposing criminal sanctions on 
moral questions.
I. Historical Development of the Case Law
This area of the law has had a long, much encumbered de­
velopment with the first prosecutions in the early seventeen 
hundreds1 and the first important statutory prohibition2 in the mid- 
eighteen hundreds. Not long after this statute the landmark case 
of R. v. Hicklin laid down the Hicklin test, where Cockburn,
C.J. stated:
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1 R. v. R ead  (1709), 11 M od. Rep. 142; 88 E.R. 953 
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2 Lord Campbell’s Act (The O bscene Publications Act] (1857) (U .K .) 20-21 
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I think the test o f obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the 
matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose 
minds are open to such immoral influences, and into w hose hands a 
publication of this sort may fall.3
Not withstanding the many criticisms4 of the above rule, it 
survived as law in Canada for nearly a century.
It is interesting to note that the Draft Criminal Code (Indict­
able Offences) prepared in 1879 by an English Royal Commission 
headed by Sir James Stevens, did not contain a definition of the 
word “obscene”. It was felt by the Commissioners that the word 
should be allowed to adopt the meaning that the word itself con­
veys.5 The code prepared by Stevens was rejected in England but 
was later accepted in Canada, passed in 1891 and became law in 
1892. Thus Canada had its first statutory regulation of criminal 
law, which included controls on the publication of obscene ma­
terial.6
This area of the law developed very slowly with only five cases 
from 1900 to 19407, all of which followed the test laid down in the 
Hicklin case. It was not until 1944 and the case of Conway v. The 
King* that the Hicklin test was first challenged and altered by the 
introduction of the element of mens rea into the test by Lazure J. 
Professor Laskin (as he then was) regarded this a welcome addition 
to the test, although he questioned the logic in arriving at such a 
conclusion.9
This case led the way for change in Canada, but it was not a 
true pioneer for it fell in line with the earlier American decision of
U.S. v. The Book Ulysses.10
3 (1868), L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, at p. 371.
4 (1954), 32 Can. Bar Rev. 1010, at p. 1011; (1966), 44 Can. Bar Rev. 243, at 
p. 245; these are but two of the numerous criticisms of the H icklin  test.
5 Report of the Royal Commission (1879), at p. 22.
6 S.C. 1892, C. 29, S. 179.
7 The K ing  v. M cA uliffe  (1904), 8 C.C.C. 21 (Co. Ct.).
The Queen x .Jourdan  (1904), 8 C.C.C. 337 (Mtl. R ec. Ct.).
R. v. B eaver (1904), 9 C.C.C. 415 (Ont. C .A.).
R. v. M acDougall (1909). 15 C.C.C. 466 (N.B.S.C.).
R. v. St. Claire (1913), 21 C.C.C. 350 (Ont. C.A.); and see (1966), 44 Can. 
Bar Rev. 243. at p. 246, footnote 14.
8 [1944] 2 D.L.R. 530.
9 (1944),, 22 Can. Bar Rev. 553.
10 (1933), 5 F. Supp. 182; a ffd  (1934), 72 F. 2d 705.
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This liberal approach to the Hicklin test was continued in 
Canada in the case of R. v. National News11 where the Court, in 
considering the effect of four novels and seven magazines on the 
public, considered a normal segment of the public which was par­
ticularly sensitive to moral influences. The logic in this qualifi­
cation is sound, for in no other area of the law do we consider the 
general public as being sensitive or fragile, nor do we use these in­
dividuals as the guidelines for our laws.
The antiquity of the Hicklin test is also noted in the courts 
decision where in dicta it was stated that that which may corrupt 
and deprave one generation may not do so to another generation.12 
The logic in such a statement is sound and is captured by later 
cases.
The development of the Ulysses case in the U.S. and the Con­
way case in Canada culminated in the English decision of R. v. 
Martin Seeker Warburg Ltd. &.Others.13 This case deals with the 
novel entitled The Philanderers, (distributed in Canada as The 
Tightrope)14 which depicted the infidelity of a man obsessed with 
his desire for women.
Stable, J. in his decision imposed two important qualifications 
on the Hicklin test: (1) the element of contemporariness was added 
and, (2) he stated that the book was to be considered as a whole. 
With respect to the first qualification his opinion is well illustrated 
by the following:
Because that is a test laid down in 1868, that does not m ean that 
what you have to consider is, supposing this book had been published 
in 1868 and the publishers had been prosecuted in 1868, whether the 
court or the jury, nearly a century ago, would have reached the conclu­
sion that the book was an obscene book. Your task is to decide whether 
you think that the tendency of the book is to deprave those w hose minds 
today are open to such immoral influences and into w hose hands the 
book may fall in this year, or last year when it was published in this coun­
try, or next year or the year after that.15
Although the second qualification made by Stable, J. was a new 
departure in Canada, it merely followed earlier American case 
law on the point.16 This development was essential for the develop­
11 (1953), 106 C.C.C. 26.
12 Ibid ., at p. 29.
13 [1954) 2 All E.R. 683; see M ackay’s discussion in ( 1954), 32 Can. Bar Rev. 1010.
14 (1954), 32 Can. Bar Rev. 1010, at p. 1016.
15 [1954] 2 All E.R. 683, at p. 685.
16 C om m onw ealth  v. B uckley  (1909), 200 Mass. 346; 86 N.E. 910 
C om m onw ealth  v. F riede (1930), 271 Mass. 318; 171 N.E. 472.
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ment of both law and literature, for in the past isolated extracts 
were examined to determine the question of obscenity with no 
attempt or possibility of evaluating the literary merits of the work 
in question.
It appeared that progress was being made and the old Hicklin 
rule was being modified to meet the changing time, but the case of 
R. v. American News Co. Ltd. '7 extinguished this spark of hope. 
In considering the novel entitled Episode, Laidlaw, J.A., giving 
judgment in the Ontario Court of Appeal,18 rejected the Warburg 
case and rested his decision on R. v. Reiter™ which was decided 
a month prior to Warburg. By his action Laidlaw, J.A. restored 
the Hicklin test to its position prior to the Warburg case with its 
two very important qualifications.
In an article entitled ‘‘The Hicklin Rule and Judicial Censor­
ship ”,20 Mackay discussed this case in light of the statutory defence 
of “public good” under Section 150 (3).
How can obscenity ever be in the public interest? Obviously som e­
thing is wrong. Either the public has a perverted sense o f what is good  
for it or the definition of what constitutes obscenity is perverted. Ob­
scenity cannot be for the public good. Literature which serves the public 
good cannot be ob scene.21
It is clear that the decision in American News and Warburg 
are not compatible. And one must be rejected. If Warburg is re­
jected we are placed back in the position of selecting isolated 
passages from publications for the purpose of determining the 
obscenity question. Such an approach is clearly wrong for it elim­
inates any hope of evaluating the literary merits of a work, which 
should be of prime concern to society.22
In light of the anomalous nature of the defence of “public 
good” as pointed out by Mackay,23 it is paradoxical that this de­
fence will never be available under the American News case. The 
reason this defence will never be available is that the whole pub­
lication cannot be examined and therefore its literary merits can­
not be determined; and it can never be considered to be for the 
public good.
17 (1957), 118 C.C.C. 152.
18 Ib id . , at p. 160.
19 [1954)2  0 8 . 1 6 .
20 (1958), 36 Can. Bar Rev. 1, on the defence o f “Public G ood”; see also (1962)
20 U. of T. Faculty o f Law Rev. 5, at p. 16.
21 Ibid ., at p. 8.
22 (1958-59), 1 Osgoode Hall L.J. 69, at p. 71. Discussion on R. v. A m erican News.
23 (1958), 36 Can. Bar Rev. 1, at p. 8.
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Laidlaw, J.A. did make one concession to liberalism in fol­
lowing Pickup, C.J.O.’s dicta in the National News case: that the 
susceptability to corrupting and depraving material may change 
from generation to generation.24
In his decision in American News Laidlaw, J.A. was not with­
out criticism of the Hicklin test for he found the test to be vague 
and impossible to apply objectively. Such judicial sentiment, sup­
ported by post-World War II pressure to reduce the flood of what 
many felt was objectionable material, led to the appointment of 
a Special Committee of the Senate in 1952 to consider obscenity. 
The committee’s recommendations were introduced to the House 
of Commons in 1957 by Hon. E.D. Fulton in the form of Bill C-58.25 
The passing of this Bill resulted in the amendment to Section 150 
and the addition of subsection (8), which defined the word “ob­
scene”.26
At the same time as the above mentioned amendment a new 
in rem procedure based on the old Lord Campbell’s Act27 was 
added in the form of Section 150 A.28 Since its debut this section 
has received much attention, both as to its efficacy and its inter­
pretation.
The introduction of these amendments was not without dis­
cussion and in its course the element of confusion was anticipated. 
Senator Roebuck pointed out that the legislature had not made 
it clear whether or not the new subsection (8) of Section 150 was 
intended to be in addition to or a substitute for the long standing 
Hicklin test.30
24 (1953), 106 C.C.C. 26. at p. 29.
25 5 H.C. Deb. (Can) 5541 (1959).
26 S.C. 1959, C. 41, S.C.C.
27 The Obscene Publications Act. (1857) (U.K.) 20-21 Viet., C. 83.
28 S.C. 1959, C. 41. S. 12.
29 For a discussion of S. 150 A see the following:
(1964-65), 7 Cr. L.Q. 187
M ueller v. M cD onald  (1962), 37 C.R. 336, 133 C.C.C. 183
R, v. Dom inion N ew s & Gifts Ltd. (1963), 40 C.R., [1963] 2 C.C.C. 103 rvs'd
[1964] S.C.R. 251.
R. v. M id-W estern N ew s A gency  (1966), 47 C.R. 227, 52 W .W .R. 119 (Sask) 
R. v. A dam s, [1969] 2 C.C.C. 21 (N.S.)
This list is not intended to be exhaustive on the discussion of this section.
30 (1966), 44 Can. Bar Rev. 243, at p. 256, footnote 61 [(1959), Deb. of the Sen. 
(Can.), p. 9%].
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In his presentation of this bill, Mr. Fulton had stated that his 
intention was to eliminate the “trash", the cause of public pressure, 
from the newstands. To fulfill this purpose he was introducing the 
new subsection. His intention was for the objective test to be used 
for the “trash"while reserving the Hicklin test for publications and 
productions with literary merit. The irony of this intention is that 
after the American News obscenity with respect to texts was judged 
by the examination of isolated passages which made any intention 
to weigh literary merit impossible.
Aside from the problem of whether Hicklin was a dead issue 
in Canada the new test of obscenity was much criticized both 
for its vagueness and its conservatism. The latter point is well 
made by Leon Getz.
The result is a test which reflects the views of the unimaginative 
and faceless, the death-knell of the creative writer. A test is created  
that is barely more sophistocated than under the Hicklin rule. For in­
stead of allowing the range o f available reading matter to be determined 
by the tastes of an impressionable fourteen-year-old girl — as it was un­
der Hicklin — we will have substituted the tastes of. say, the middle- 
aged, conformist white-collar worker desperately trying not to be dif­
ficult.31
Now the courts were faced with the problem enunciated by 
Senator Roebuck, to decide what effect this new legislation had on 
the Hicklin rule. The courts were faced with a difficult problem 
for they had to determine the intent of the legislature by examin­
ing the section itself and then apply this to the stated problem. 
It was impossible for the courts to speculate on intent from the 
bare legislation and the recognized aid of examining the history 
of legislation was not available for there was no history. For this 
reason Quebec courts ignored the rule which prohibits the court 
from using legislative history as evidence of legislative intent and 
introduced into court Mr. Fulton’s presentations to the House 
of Commons.32
The Quebec case in question was that of R. v. Standard News 
Distributors Inc.33 where, with Mr. Fulton’s assistance, the court 
concluded that Hicklin was still to be considered in Canada. The 
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, in R. v. M unster34 came to a simi*
31 (1964-66), 2 U.B.C.L. Rev. 216, at p. 228 (Much criticism has been leveled  
against this new test from the civil rights viewpoint, but that matter will be 
developed in Part III of this paper.).
32 (1966), 44 Can. Bar Rev. 243, at p. 260.
33 (1961), 34 C.R. 54.
34 (1960), 129 C.C.C. 277; 45 M.P.R. 157 (N.S.S.C.).
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lar conclusion stating that Hicklin had survived the legislative a- 
mendment. Ilsley, C.J. concluded that Hicklin not only survived 
but, by implication, was the true test of obscenity, for the new legis­
lation did not purport to be a definition of the term.35
The issue of Hicklin’s survival had been adjucicated but the 
final answer had not been determined, nor has it been today. The 
beginning of this long debated question was Brodie, Dansky and 
Rubin v. R .36 where for the first time the Supreme Court of Can­
ada was presented with the question. The decision has been much 
discussed on the point of whether the new sub-section (8) was an 
exhaustive definition of obscenity or whether Hicklin complemented 
the new amendment.37 There have been several interpretations of
35 Ibid., at p. 279.
36 [1962] S.C.R. 681; (1962), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 507.
37 The following is a list of the cases since Brodie  which dealt with the status of 
Section 150 (8) and the Hicklin  rule.
R. v. M odenese  (1962), 38 C.R. 45; (1962-63). 5 G.L.Q. 259 (B.C. Mag. Ct.) -  
used both S. 150 (8) and Hicklin  test as a precautionary measure; R ex re l R ose  
v. M arshall ( 1962), 48 M.P.R. 64 (Nfld. Dist. Ct.) — S. 150 (8) is exhaustive; 
R. v. H arte-M axwell ( l% 2 ), 39 C.R. 172 (Ont. Co. Ct.) -  used only S. 150 (8); 
R. v. D om inion N ew s & G ifts Ltd. (1963), 42 W .W .R. 65; a ffd  [1964] S.C.R. 
251 (S.C.C.) open question as to whether Hicklin  still applied, (probably no); 
R. v. Fraser ( 1965), 52 W .W .R. 712, at pp. 729-30; a ffd  [ 1967] S.C.R. 39 (S.C.C.) 
S. 150 (8) is exhaustive; R. v. Lam bert (1965), 53 W .W .R. 186 (B.C.S.C.) — 
S. 150 (8) is exhaustive — this case was rejected in Georgia Straight case; R. 
v. C. Coles Co. (1965), 44 C.R. 219 (Ont. C.A.) — S. 150 (8) is exhaustive; Re  
G ordon M agazine Enterprises Ltd. ( 1965). 46 C.R. 313 (Ont. C.A.) — used only  
S. 150 (8); R. v. A dam s ( 1966), 48 C.R. 143; [ 1966] 4 C.C.C. 42 (N.S. Co. Ct.) -  
followed Hicklin test; R. v. Cameron, [1966] 2 O.R. I l l  — followed B rodie: 
R. v. D utchie B ooks L td ., [1967] 1 C.C.C. 254; 58 D.L.R. (2d) 274 (B.C.C.A.); -  
used only S. 150 (8); R. v. H uot ( 1967-68), 10 Cr. L.Q. 447 — Hicklin  no longer 
applies; R. v. Dequin  (1968-69), 5 C.R.N.S. 154, at p. 158 — Hicklin  does not 
apply to charges under S. 150; R. v. Salida, [1969] 1 O.R. 203 — S. 150 (8) is 
exhaustive; R. v. O'Reilly, [1970] 3 O.R. 429 -  S. 150 (8) is exhaustive; R. v. 
G reat W est N ew s Ltd. (1970), 72 W .W .R. 354; (1969-70), 12 Cr. L.Q. 357 (Man. 
C.A.) — point not necessary to decide; R. v. M cL eod  (1970), 73 W .R.R. 221 
(B.C. Co. Ct.), at p. 223 — Hicklin  is dead; R. v. G eorgia Straight Publishing 
Ltd. [1970] 1 C.C.C. 359 (B.C. Co. Ct.) — S. 150 (8) is exhaustive for publica­
tions; R. v. Prairie Schooner N ew s Ltd.,[ 1971] 1 C.C.C. (2d) 251; (1970), 12 
Cr. L.Q- 462 (Man. C .A.) — follow ed Brodie; R. v G oldberg and Reitm an  [ 1971 ]
4 C.C.C. (2d) 187; [1971] 3 O.R. 323 — followed Brodie-, R. v. Pipeline News 
(1972), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 71; [1972] 1 W.W.R. 241 (Alta) -  used only S. 159 (8) 
(Note the change in section number,); R. v. Beaudoin, [1972] 2 W .W .R. 140 
(Alta) -  used only S. 159 (8); R. v. Johnson, [1972] 3 W .W .R. 226 (Alta) -  
used only S. 159(8);/?. v. Daylight Theatre Co., [1972] 3 W .W .R. 578 (Sask.) — 
S. 159 (8) is exhaustive; R. v. Small (1972), 6 C.C.C. (2d) 195 (B.C. Co. Ct.) -  
S. 159 (8) is exhaustive for publications; and R. v. Carty (1972), 6 C.C.C. (2d) 
248 (Alta. Dist. Ct.) — used both tests.
«=5!,
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this case by the courts and a great deal of criticisnl due to the 
cloud of ambiguity surrounding it.38
The problem posed by the Brodie case, whether subsection (8) 
of section 150 is an exhaustive definition of obscenity, is that there 
was not a majority of the nine supreme court justices deciding 
either in favor of or against this proposition. The actual result as 
to what each judge said on this point has seen at least four judicial 
interpretations with the consensus being that the issue is still an 
open one. There is no question that the position of the court was 
that Hicklin was dead; three judges were definite that subsection
(8) was an exhaustive definition of obscenity while two more, by 
implication, agreed with this result.
The confusion mentioned above, and predicted by Senator 
Roebuck, continued in the first case following the decision in 
Brodie. In R. v. Modenese,39 Orr, P.M. took the safe road, first 
rejecting his interpretation of Brodie as incorrect.
Orr, P.M. was not alone in his confusion, for in the next case, 
R. v. Dominion News &Gifts Ltd., Freedman, J.A. in his dissent, 
which was later followed in the Supreme Court of Canada, also 
left the question open:
I do not find it necessary in the present appeals to consider whether 
obscenity is exhaustively defined by Sec. 150 (8) o f the Code or whether 
resort may still be had to the test enumerated in Reg. v. Hicklin  (1868) 
L.R. 3 Q.B. 360,37 L.J.M.C. 89. As I read the judgments in Reg. v. Brodie; 
Reg. \.D a n sk y \R eg . v./?uftin,[ 1962] S.C.R. 681 there was no clear major­
ity o f the Supreme Court in favour of one view or the other. On the appeals 
before us, however, counsel both for the Crown and for the accused have 
argued the case on the footing that sec. 150 (8) is exhaustive. In these cir­
cum stances I propose to deal with the matter on that basis, reserving that 
question for decision in any subsequent case, if it should then be still open  
for consideration.40
38 For criticisms o f the Brodie case, see the cases in footnote 37 and the following  
articles:
(1964-66), 2 U.B.C.L. Rev. 216
(1966), 44 Can. Bar Rev. 243
(1962-63), 5 Cr. L.Q. 259
(1969-70), 12 Cr. L.Q. 10
This list is not meant to be exhaustive.
39 (1962), 38 C.R. 45; for a discussion on this point see (1962-63). 5 Cr. L.Q- 259.
40 (1963), 42 W.W.R. 65, at p. 79 reversed in [1964) S.C.R. 251 (S.C.C.).
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The last words of this quotation are of particular importance because 
Freedman, J.A. states explicitly that he is not deciding the question 
as to whether the statute is exhaustive, and yet his judgment is cited 
in subsequent cases as an authority for this proposition.41 At this 
point it is cogent to say that the development of this area of the law 
could incite the jurisprudential scholars.
As illustrated by footnote 37, the weight of the case law supports 
the proposition that the statutory definition of obscenity is exhaus­
tive. Many of the cases use both tests and several decisions rest on 
such weak authority as Freedman, J.A.’s judgment in R. v. Domin­
ion News & Gifts Ltd.
It is significant to note that only one judgment since the Brodie 
case rested solely on the Hicklin test, that of R. v. Adams. In that 
case O’Hearn, J., in an exhaustive survey of this subject, felt that 
the common law and the statutory definitions were complemen­
tary and were both required to cover the subject. Even this case, 
which gives Hicklin its strongest support held that where there is 
a conflict, Hicklin is pre-empted by the statute. As O’Hearn, J. 
stated:
There is thus no clash between "obscene” as com m only un­
derstood and as defined in S. 150 (8) but where they differ in emphasis 
or otherwise, the latter governs, unless the law developed from the Hick­
lin case also plays som e part.42
From the cases, it appears that Hicklin is of little more than his­
torical significance, unless the approach taken by MacFarlane, 
J. in the case of R. v. Lambert is followed. In this view section 153 
applied to more than publications and therefore subsection (8) of 
section 150 does not provide an exhaustive definition of the term. 
After quoting that subsection he stated:
This subsection has been described frequently as a definition of 
“obscene”. In my respectful opinion, it is not and does not purport to 
be a definition of that word. It says merely that a publication possessing 
certain characteristics is deem ed to be obscene. A careful analysis of 
the reasons for judgment delivered in the Brodie case does not convince 
me that I am bound to hold otherwise and I do hold, accordingly, that 
sec. 153 does apply to things which are not publications.43
41 R . v. Fraser, (1965), 52 W .W .R. 712.
R. v. C. C oles Co. (1965), 44 C.R. 219.
42 (1966), 48 C.R. 143, at p. 178 (N.S. Co. Ct.).
43 (1965), 53 W .W .R. 186 at pp. 189-90 (B.C.S.C.).
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By stating that section 153 applied to things which are not publi­
cations, MacFarlane, J. was implying that subsection (8) of section 
150 applies to publications while the Hicklin test is still applicable 
to non-publications.
The approach in the Lambert case, which was rejected in R. 
v. Georgia Straight Publishing Ltd., is a seemingly logical one, 
in light of the intention of the legislature as to the complementary 
status of the two tests.
Unfortunately, the weight of the case law supports the propo­
sition that the statute is an exhaustive definition of obscenity. 
The manner in which the courts have avoided the logical con­
clusion in both the Adams and Lambert cases is by extending the 
word publication, giving it a broader scope than the legislature 
intended.
Such an extension is evident from the following excerpt from 
Lodner, J.’s decision on the performance “The Beard” in the case 
of R. v. Small:
As was said by Wilson, J. (now C.J.S.C.), in R. v. Leong  (1961),
132 C.C.C. 273 at p. 274 37 C.R. 317 ,38  W .W .R. 1 1 4 : . . .  where the word 
“publication” is used in a penal statute without definition, and with no 
context which would assign to it a special meaning it must be considered  
to bear the meaning it would bear in ordinary English speech or writing. 
Certainly, where crime is involved a court should not go out of its way 
to attribute to the word an extraordinary meaning involving the culp­
ability o f the accused, but should rather hew strictly to the line resolving 
any possible doubt in favour of the accused.
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines publication, inter 
alia, as “the action of publishing” and “publish” as, inter alia; “to make 
publicly or generally known; to declare openly or publicly; to tell or 
noise abroad, . .
I find that the performance in question was a publication.44
In short, the present situation is as follows: Hon. E.D. Fulton, in 
1957, introduced the amendment to section 150 to the House of 
Commons with the intention that it be used as a complement to 
the Hicklin test; to give the old rule new scope. It is unfortunate 
that Senator Roebuck’s words of caution went unheeded for the 
problem he foresaw came to fruition and the courts have departed 
from Parliament’s original intention, in most cases, by stating 
that the Hicklin rule is no longer applicable in Canada.
One final evaluation of the Brodie case and support for the 
view that the courts have left Hicklin to history is a statement by 
Bull, J.A. in the case of R. v. Fraser:
44 (1972), 6 C.C.C. (2d) 195, at p. 203 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
o
In the judgment in Brodie, D ansky and Rubin  v. R eg, 119621 S.C.R.
681, 37 C.R. 120, C.C.C. 101, reversing [1961] Que. Q.B. 610, 32 C.R.
20B, the situation arose where three o f the learned judges o f five giving 
the majority judgments were o f the view that sec. 150 (8) contained the 
exhaustive definition, one learned judge o f the majority was o f the nega­
tive view but reserved the right to consider the matter in another case. 
However, two o f the four learned justices o f the minority in view seem ed  
to lean towards the affirmative position that the statutory test was ex­
haustive. The Brodie case was followed by Reg. v. Dom . N ew s & Gifts
(1962) L td .___ wherein Freedman, J.A., in a dissenting judgment, based
his decision on the assumption that sec. 150 (8) was exhaustive, counsel 
having argued the case on that footing. The Supreme Court o f Canada, 
sitting with a court o f seven, unanimously affirmed the dissenting judg­
ment of Freedman, J.A., adopting his “reasons in their entirety.” It is 
consequently, my view that the Supreme Court has duly adopted or ac­
cepted the proposition that the said statutory definition of obscenity  
is exhaustive and replaces the tests in the Hicklin case. In the recent case  
of R eg  v. C. Coles Co. ( 1965), 44 C.R. 219, reversing 42 C.R. 368, this 
view was accepted by the Ontario Court o f Appeal. 5
At this point I will leave the Hicklin case in its grave, although it 
has yet to be covered, assume that the statute is exhaustive on the 
definition of obscenity and proceed to an evaluation of this statu­
tory definition.
II Evaluation of S. 159 (8)
In the course of this evaluation I will examine the cases since 
the amendment was introduced in 1959, in order to evaluate to­
day’s position. The sequence of events leading up to the 1959 
amendment have been set down in Part I of this paper and need 
not be repeated.
The subsection has had a very short history, becoming law first 
in 195946 as 150 (8) and remaining unchanged, except for the sec­
tion number, which became 159 (8) in 1970. It reads as follows:
For the purposes o f the A ct, and publication a dominant charac­
teristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or o f sex and anyone 
or more of the following subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty and 
violence, shall be deem ed to be obscene.47
The problems that have arisen in interpreting these words 
have three focal points in this section, which will be examined in 
the order in which they appear in the subsection.
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45 (1965), 52 W .W .R. 712, at pp. 729-30; afrd [1967] S.C.R. 38.
46 S.C. 1959, C. 41, S. 11.
47 1970 R.S.C., S. 34, S. 159 (8).
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The first part of this subsection which has warranted judicial 
pronouncement is the phrase, “for the purpose of the Act”. The 
reason this is noteworthy is that the word “Act” broadens the scope 
of this definition to other sections in the code. An example of this 
extension is seen in the case of R. v. Macl^eod, where the argu­
ment was posed that this definition was restricted to the section 
in which it appeared. On this point Darling, C.C.J. stated:
Since sec. 150 (8) specified that “for the purposes o f this A ct” ob­
scenity is defined as therein set forth . . . this definition, covers, in my
opinion, sec. 150 A cases . . .*
The broad application of this subsection provides support 
to the argument that Hicklin is no longer needed, because the de­
finition therein set forth applies to all obscenity cases.
The proponants of retention of Hicklin agree that this definition 
applies to all obscenity cases but only as pertaining to publica­
tions, following the Lambert49 case.
The next part of the subsection which has been the subject of 
interpretation is the word “publication”.50 To the layman it would 
seem strange that enlightened justices should have any difficulty 
interpreting such a word, but the development of the law in this 
area could hinge on this word. Since the Hicklin rule has been dis­
pensed with, the scope of obscenity law in Canada now lies in, 
“what constitutes a publication”.
The courts which have pronounced Hicklin dead are now, 
through judicial creativity, expanding the scope of “publication”. 
As noted previously, the Small case has pronounced a theatrical 
production as a publication. This being so, it seems possible that 
the whole scope of conduct which previously fell within Hicklin 
will be considered in the future to come within the realm of a pub­
lication.
Each time the court expands the scope of “publication” it re­
inforces the judiciary’s pronouncement that Hicklin is dead but at 
the same time it is expanding the statutory definition of obscene 
to cover the cases covered by Hicklin in the past.
The logic in such an approach is questionable but once the 
courts rejected Hicklin there was little choice available. It is evi­
dent at this point that what is needed is a legislative pronounce­
ment in the form of a revision.
48 (1970), 73 W .W .R. 221, at p. 231 (B.C. Co. C O .
49 (1965), 53 W .W .R. 186 (B.C.S.C.).
50 R. v. /Warn* (1966), 48 C.R. 143, at p. 158.
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In view of subsection (1) of section 159, it is arguable that the 
extension of the meaning of “publication” in subsection (8) is with­
out substance. The courts have given “publication” under sub­
section (8) a very broad scope and if this is the proper interpre­
tation of legislative intent it would appear redundant for the enum­
eration of offences in subsection (1), of which “publication” is 
only one.
The courts have had little difficulty in determining what con­
stitutes a “dominant characteristic”51 under this subsection, which 
is perhaps some consolation to the legislator; but the last words 
to be examined, “undue exploitation”52 more than compensate.
It has been stated in many cases that the exploitation of sex is not 
offensive perse. To be offensive the exploitation must be “undue”. 
While it is difficult to determine with precision the meaning of 
“undue”, it is agreed that it must be evaluated in accordance with 
“community standards”.53 When one considers the difficulties in­
volved in determing such standards the scope of the problem be­
comes apparent.
The community standard concept was first introduced in the 
Australian case of R. v. Close54 which was later followed in both 
Australia55 and New Zealand56 with Brodie being the first Cana­
dian case on point.
The pertinent questions to be considered are: what constitutes 
the community standard?; how does one proceed with such an 
evaluation?; and finally, is this a question of law or a question of 
fact?
With respect to the first question, Freedman, J.A.’s much 
cited opinion in R. v. Dom. News & Gifts (1962) Ltd. provides 
some insight.
51 Ibid., at p. 159.
52 Ibid., at pp. 161-62.
53 Ibid., at p. 164; see also (I960), 37 Dicta 231; (1965), 2 U.B.C .I. Rev. 216; (1969- 
70), 32 L.Q. 10, at p. 16.
54 11948] V.L.R. 445; (1972), 50 Can. Bar Rev. 315. at p. 316.
55 Wavisia v. A ssocia ted  N ew s P apers, [1959] V iet. L.R. 57; (1972), 50 Can. Bar 
Rev. 315, at p. 316.
56 R e Lolita, [1960] N.Z.L.R. 871; (1972). 50 Can. Bar Rev. 315 at p. 316.
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Community standards must be contemporary. Tim es change and 
ideas change with them . . . Community standards must also be local.
In other words, they must be Canadian. In applying the definition in the 
Criminal Code we must determ ine what is obscene by Canadian standards, 
regardless o f the attitudes which may prevail elsewhere, be they more lib­
eral or less so .57
It was stated in the Brodie case that undue exploitation was to 
be interpreted in terms of community standards and Freedman, 
J. A. in the Dom. News case stated that these standards must be both 
contemporary and Canadian. These qualifications by Freedman, 
J. A, make it clear that in every case the court must make a determin­
ation as to community standards, due to the fluid nature of this con­
cept.
Let us turn now to the question of proof and the type of evidence 
accepted by the court in determining this standard. The first mattei 
to be examined is the use of expert evidence. In the early develop­
ment of the community standard concept the use of experts was 
questionable; their evidence was admissable, but it carried no more 
weight than that of the layman. As Martin, J. stated in the case of 
Wavisa v. Asscoiated Newspapers:
. . .  when the question is whether a book or article, judged by present 
day standards,. . .  offends against the standards of the com munity, I con­
sider that a magistrate or jury is just as capable o f deciding if it is likely to 
have that effect as are psychiatrists or psychologists.58
This opinion was accepted in the cases immediately following; thus 
the early Australian cases support the view that determining the 
standard is the responsibility of the judge. This view remains much 
the same today as indicated by Dickson, J.A.’s survey of the cases in 
R. v. Great West News where he stated;
This review o f decisions o f courts at the provincial level would seem  
to suggest — and I have been unable to find any case in which a different 
conclusion was reached — that the courts have not found it necessary to 
call upon expert testimony to describe the standards of the community.
Such evidence is, o f course, admissable but that is not the same thing as 
saying it is essential.59
57 (1965), 42 W .W .R., 65 at p. 80. Freedman, J.A.’s dissenting judgment was fol­
lowed in 11964) S.C.R. 251 (S.C.C.).
58 [1959] V.R. 57, at p. 63; (1972), 50 Can Bar Rev. 315, footnote 10.
59 (1970), 10 C.R.N.S. 42, at p. 49 (Man. C.A.).
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In the course of his discussion on this point Dickson, J. A. found 
only one exception to the rule that expert evidence is not essential. 
That exception was Laskin, J.A.’s dissenting opinion if R. v. Cam­
eron.60 It is safe to conclude that expert evidence is of no special 
value. The layman’s opinion carries equal weight.
Expert evidence of a particular type is required, however, 
in connection with the use of public surveys to determine public 
opinion. The reason experts are needed for the interpretation of 
surveys is obvious, for it requires expertise which the layman, 
including the judiciary, does not have.
The first problem faced with the introduction into court of 
surveys was the hearsay rule, and in Building Products Ltd. v. 
B.P. Canada Ltd.61 such evidence was rejected. This problem was 
later overcome by the court determining that the prerequisites 
for the rule were not met. As Jessup, J. held in R. v. Time Square 
Cinema Ltd.
. . .  no question of inadmissible hearsay arises because the survey 
or poll is not offered to prove the truth of the statements it contains, 
but merely to show the foundation of the opinion of the expert on com ­
munity standards.62
The case law on public surveys, with respect to community 
standards, has been reviewed in an article by Richard G. Fox,63 with 
the case sequence contained therein.64 It appears through this case 
development that the courts have reached the point of expecting 
experts to both conduct and interpret public surveys. With the 
increasing frequency of public surveys and their admissibility hav­
ing become established, it is unfortunate that one must conclude 
that the subjectivity of the judge is still the ruling factor.
60 [19661 4 C.C.C. 273, 49 C.R. 49; as discussed Ibid.. at p. 48.
61 (1961). 21 Fox Pat. Ct. 130.
62 (1971), 4 C.C.C. (2d) 229, at p. 240.
63 (1972), 50 Can. Bar Rev. 315.
64 Alum inum  G oods L td. v. R egistrar o f  Tradem arks. [ 1954) Ex. C.R. 79; 14 Fox 
Pat. C. 41.
Building Products Ltd. v. B.P. Canada L td . ( 1961 ) 21 Fox Pat. C. 120.
R. v. M urray, (1969) 4 C.C.C. 147; 3 D.L.R. (3d) 289.
R. v. Prairie Schooner N ew s Ltd. (1971), 1 C.C.C. (2d) 251; 75 W .W .R. 585; 
(1970), 12 Cr. L.Q. 462.
R. v. Tim es Square Cinema Ltd. (1971), 4 C.C.C. (2d) 229; 11971) 30 R. 688. 
R. v. P ipeline N ew s (1972), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 71.
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As Fox states the point in a review of the most recent Cana­
dian case:
There is an ultimate irony in the Pipeline N ew s  case for, having es­
tablished that science was inadequate to assist him decide (sic] whether 
the material before the court contravened Canadian community stand­
ards, the trial judge, in accordance with well established principle, duti­
fully applied a standard based upon his own subjective experiences . . . 
the judge must, in the final analysis, endeavour to apply what he, in light 
of his experience, regards as contemporary standards of the Canadian 
community.®
With all the scientific advances in survey techniques and in­
terpretive skills in recent years the community standards determ­
ination should be easily determined by expert evidence. This has 
not happened and the approach of Legg, D.C.J. in the Pipeline 
News case in the end result is similar to that of Martin, J. in the 
Wavish case. The court is ready to admit surveys and experts 
but in the final analysis the lawyer would be best advised to gain 
some insight into the judge’s subjective attitudes.
The final question to be asked concerning community standards 
is whether it is a question of law or fact. This point, like most 
others on this topic, is dealt with in the Adams case. O’Heam, J. 
in his analysis concluded “that the determination of contemporary 
Canadian community standards is a question of fact”.66 Support 
for this conclusion is found in the fact that with only one excep­
tion,67 the Appeal Courts have reversed trial court findings rather 
than sending them back for a new trial. Two statutory provisions are 
also cited in support of his conclusion. The first, subsection (6) 
of section 150A, which enlarges the possibility for appeals on 
questions of fact and secondly, a specific provision in subsection
(4) of section 150 which provides for a special case where a ques­
tion of law is involved.
If O’Heam J’s conclusion is correct then judges would be 
better advised to be guided by the results of public surveys lather 
than imposing their own views on a question of fact.
The two matters which remain to be considered in this Part 
are mens rea and the defences against a charge under the obscen­
ity sections of the Code.
65 (1972), 50 Can. Bar Rev. 315, at p. 329.
66 (1966), 48 C.R. 143 at p. 164.
67 R. v. M unster (1960), 45 M.P.R. 157; 34 C.R. 47; 129, C.C.C. 277; cited in the 
A dam s case, at p. 164.
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Let us first consider the element of mens rea, the mental ele­
ment of a crime. In this age of mass publication and circulation of 
printed matter it would seem harsh to prosecute the owner of a 
small bookstore for exposing for sale publications, the nature of 
which he was unaware. By removing this element of knowledge 
the result is one of strict liability which imposes a heavy onus.
A study of the “corrupting morals” section makes it evident 
that mens rea is an important issue to be considered in any dis­
cussion of a prosecution in this area. Section 159 contains two 
charging provisions, subsections (1) and (2). An important point 
of distinction between these provisions is that subsection (2) con­
tains the word “knowingly” while subsection (1) does not. The 
significance of this distinction is made clear in the comments of 
Magistrate Honrahn in R. ex rel. Burns v. Menkin where he states:
In Sherras v. D e Rutzen  [1895] 1 Q.B. 918 a Divisional Court in 
England held the introduction of the word “knowingly” or a like word, 
into the description of an offence, proving guilty knowledge; while in 
its absence proof o f absence o f a guilty knowledge was on the accused .68
As regards the onus of proof, therefore, it is clear that under 
subsection (1) the accused must prove absence of guilty knowledge 
while under subsection (2) the burden is on the prosectuion.
Any doubt with respect to the absence of the mental element 
under subsection (1) is quickly displaced with an examination of 
subsection (6). There it is stated that the ignorance of the accused 
is not a defence to the charge. Thus we see that from the viewpoint 
of the burden of proof, it is most important under which section 
the Crown proceeds.
With two charging provisions in this one section and a pro­
cedural distinction of crucial importance it might be hoped that 
the two subsections would be mutually exclusive with the cases 
under each being easily discernible. Unfortunately this is not the 
case and the Courts have had some difficulty in categorizing the 
cases as being within one subsection or the other. For example, 
it may be argued that the word “distribution” found in subsection 
(1) includes all the cases under “sells” in the subsection, a sale being 
one of the means of distribution. The rebuttal to this argument is 
that this could not have been the legislative intent for it would de­
feat the purpose of paragraph (a) of subsection (2).69 This point 
is more than of academic interest. It was discussed in the Supreme
68 (1957). 118 C.C.C. 306, at p. 308.
69 R. v. Yip M en, [ 1970] 4 C.C.C. 185, 9 C.R.N.S. 389 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
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Court of Canada in Fraser v. R.™ where Ritchie, J. felt that those 
sales which constituted a distribution would fall under subsection 
(1) and the remaining sales would allow the accused to avail him­
self of subsection (2).
There are many more problems than the one discussed above 
with respect to determining whether subsection (1) or (2) applies, 
this being used only as an example of the problems which arise 
if mens rea is not treated consistently throughout section 159.
By this point the precarious position of the accused should 
be apparent; for he is unable to determine with complete accuracy 
into which section his case should fall and yet the subsection under 
which he is charged is crucial. The word “crucial” is appropriate 
because a charge laid under subsection (1) is approaching strict 
liability, with the onus on the accused to prove his innocence. 
This indication of strict liability is evident in R. v. McAuslane71 
where MacKay, J.A. affirming a conviction under section 150 
(1) (a) gave little recognition to either R. v. Beaver12 or Proudman 
v. Dayman13, two important cases on this point that mistake of 
fact is a defence except where the offence is one of absolute 
liability. Reading subsections (6) and (1) together, the argument as 
to absolute liability is strengthened. Fortunately this conclusion 
and the McAuslane case have not gone without criticism74 and 
this question can be considered an open one.
It seems appropriate to conclude this discussion of mens rea 
with a statement which well illustrates the confusion in this area:
While mistake as to the law is not recognized as a m ens rea d efence, 
it is questionable whether obscenity legislation has the certainty that 
would qualify it as “law". Moreover, can it not be argued that the ac­
cused is really mistaken as to the facts in obscenity cases, because it is 
unlikely that he can read all the books that he sells, or films he distrib­
utes. and even if he did, it is unlikely that he could interpret the contents 
in any legal sense.75
Let us turn now to a consideration of the defence under sec­
tion 159. The two defences which are by far the most apparent are 
found in the words of subsections (3) and (8). The former affords 
a defence to the accused if he can prove that a publication, though 
it may be obscene, serves the public good. (The paradox of such
70 11967] S.C.R. 38.
71 [19681 1 O.R. 209 (Ont. C.A.).
72 [19571 S.C.R. 531.
73 (1941), 67 C.L.R. 356.
74 (1967-68), 10 Cr. L.Q. 373.
75 (1971), 9 Osgoode Hall L.J. 415 at p. 431; Joseph Weiler.
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a defence has been the subject of some discussion, with the con­
cept of public good being closely examined.)76 The defence under 
subsection (8) is centered on the meaning of “publication”, “dom­
inant characteristic”, and “undue exploitation”, as used therein. 
This defence would seek to bring the case outside the statute. 
With the judicial extension of the scope of the work “publication”, 
and the problems encountered in interpreting “dominant charac­
teristic”, the greatest scope for the defence lawyer would be found 
in the words “undue exploitation”. Ultimately the defence under 
this subsection should be framed around the concept of commun­
ity standards.
These two defences are exhaustive for the purposes of sub­
section (1), but not subsection (2), with its requirement for proof 
of mens rea. Together with the word “knowledge” appear the 
words “without lawful justification or excuse” which, if they have 
any significance judicially, would also indicate a possible defence.
A discussion of the defences should include a reference to 
the anomaly brought to light by R. v. Prairie Schooner News Ltd.11 
There the defence of mistake of fact, based on the fact that Cus­
toms had admitted books, was rejected.
This indicates that there may well be two independent stand­
ards as to what constitutes obscenity, thus rendering the element 
of prediction difficult and uncertain.
Ill IS THE INCLUSION OF SECTION 159 IN OUR 
CRIMINAL CODE JUSTIFIED?
This question might well be asked of all those Code provisions 
by which an attempt is made to define and control moral standards 
by criminal sanction. This is, of course, to the exclusion of sex 
crimes, and is restricted to those standards where the freedom of 
choice could provide adequate controls.
The literature in this area is voluminous because obscenity 
is very topical and has had a long history. The subject has been 
examined by professionals in all fields with no unanimity of con­
clusion. An attempt will be made here to highlight some of the 
conclusions of the American Report of a Presidential Commission 
on Obscenity and Pornography, a weighty authority giving di­
rection to a confused concept.78
A criminal code provision may be justified as being necessary
76 (1958), 36 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
77 (1970). 75 W .W .R. 585, 12 Cr. L.Q. 462; 1 C.C.C. (2d) 251 (Man. C .A.).
78 The R eport o f  the Com m ission on O bscenity and Pornography; 1970, U.S. 
Government Printing Office. W ashington, D.C.
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for the protection of society or for the rehabilitation of the indi­
vidual, or both. The social attitudes of today emphasize the re­
habilitation aspect of control, but it is clear that this has not been 
reflected in our law in relation to obscenity.
Section 159 has ignored the individual by failing to consider 
his motivation, the most important element of a moral action, 
and by failure to recognize the distinction between legal and moral 
sanctions, the latter of which would seem more appropriate for a 
moral offence. This point is well illustrated by Norman St. John- 
Stevas in his book, Law and Morals, where he states:
The most important and obvious difference between law and mor­
ality lies in the sanctions imposed. In law the sanction is essentially physi­
cal and external, consisting in a fine or the deprivation of liberty or even, 
in certain cases, o f life itself. The sanction is imposed collectively in the 
name of society after a primarily interior and imposed not by the courts 
but the conscience. In morality much stress is laid on motives, but these 
are secondary where the law is concerned. The law requires the estab­
lishment of a criminal intention, but this is ascertained not by interior 
inquisition but by external evidence. ^
From this it can be concluded that if the law is to be justified 
it must be on the basis of the protection of society. It is clear from 
the House of Commons Debates that the purpose of Section 159 
is to protect society from exposure to publications which may 
weaken our moral standards. Protection being the objective of 
the law, it is well to recall that the degree of control desired by the 
legislature has not been enunciated clearly. This had led to the 
mistaken rejection of the Hicklin rule.
It appears to be generally believed that the members of soci­
ety who are most in of protection from obscenity are the children. 
This concern for the protection of children is often emotionally 
charged and based on misconception rather than scientific data. 
Indeed, scientific research would seem to indicate that the con­
cern is largely unfounded.
It is com monly known in medical science, that sexual leanings are 
fixed at an early age, probably around 5-6 years old, and are in any case 
com pletely established by the end of puberty. It is therefore hardly likely 
that the reading of “obscene” writings or the sight of films, etc . will 
change the sexual leanings o f an adult person.80
79 Law and M orals, St. John-Stevas, Norman, at p. 17. Hawthorne Books, New 
York.
80 The Obscenity Laws, A Report by the Working Party set up by a Conference 
convened by the Chairman of the Arts council o f Great Britain, Andre Deutch, 
London WCI, at p. 32.
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The conclusion may be drawn that today’s obscene publi­
cations and even hard-core pornography have little or no influence 
on “sexual leanings” of children. Support for this conclusion is 
to be found in the Report of the U.S. Presidential Commission.
If a case is to be made against “pornography” in 1970. it will have 
to be made on grounds other than demonstrated effects o f a damaging 
personal or social nature. Empirical research designed to clarify the 
question has found no relaible evidence to date that exposure to explicit 
sexual materials plays significant role in the causation of delinquent 
or criminal sexual behaviour among youth or adults.81
While it shouid be noted that the Commission was restricted 
from surveying very young children, it is to be presumed that such 
children would be protected from exposure to obscene publica­
tions in any event.
In the light of these findings one is led to ask; who needs the 
protection of section 159? With respect to adults the laws should 
not be directed to those who are particularly sensitive but to the 
common man. In both the British and American reports cited here­
in the conclusion was drawn that there is no reliable scientific data 
supporting the proposition that pornography contributes to the 
commission of sexual offences or that it breeds sexual deviants. 
Thus it may be concluded that while some adults may occasionally 
be shocked or offended by obscene publications they do not need 
the type of protection which section 159 seeks to provide. There 
exists, therefore, a strong argument in favour of amending, or in­
deed repealing, our present restrictive legislation.
The U.S. Presidential Commission reached the same con­
clusion in their recommendations for statutory reforms.
The Commission recommends that federal, state, and local legislation 
prohibiting the sale, exhibition, or distribution of sexual materials to 
consenting adults should be repealed.82
This conclusion was reached after five years of research and 
is supported by an overwhelming amount of scientific data. It is 
not surprising in view of the trend to freedom and liberalism which 
has appeared elsewhere, particularly in Denmark where censor­
ship was abolished in relation to adults, in 1969.
81 Supra, fn. 78, at p. 139.
82 Ibid. at p. 51.
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The problem of obscenity as it relates to children must again 
be examined. It has been indicated that children are not as sus­
ceptible to sexual influences as was once supposed and that a 
reasonable control by parents should suffice. While this might re­
quire some parents to employ a double standard many parents are 
experienced in such techniques and this added burden should not 
be an unreasonable one.
It is probable that the general concern for the protection of 
children will continue to be reflected in our legislation regardless 
of the reforms which might be effected. The following provision 
continues to apply in Denmark:
Any person who sells obscene pictures or objects to any person below
16 years o f age. shall be liable to a fine.83
Some indication as to the effect on society of the repeal of 
obscenity laws can be had by viewing the experience in Denmark. 
At the time of the U.S. Presidential Commission Report, insuf­
ficient data was available to draw any scientifically sound conclu­
sions. There were, however, indications that abolition of restric­
tions on adults was having a very positive effect on society. Atti­
tudes were changing so that reaction to pornography was more 
rational and less emotional. The shock was beginning to disappear. 
Each individual quickly reached his equilibrium, with this expo­
sure having a stabilizing effect on society.
As a long recognized advocate of liberty, John Stuart Mill 
emphasized the need to continually re-evaluate laws in terms of 
their purpose in order to keep anomalies at a minimum. More 
importantly, he stressed the dangers of needlessly restraining in­
dividual expression which would result in an underdeveloped and 
premature society. His criticisms of undue restraint of society were 
meant to be constructive as well as instructive and in his most 
famous work, On Liberty, he defined what the guidelines of re­
straint should be:
The object o f this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled  
to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the 
way of com pulsion and control, whether the means used be physical 
force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public 
opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are 
warranted individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty 
of action of any o f their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose
83 Technical Report o f the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, Volum e
II, Legal Analysis, at p. 135, U.S. Government Printing Office, W ashington.
D C .
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for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civil­
ized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own  
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.®4
Following these guidelines, it is clear that the provisions of 
the Criminal Code respecting obscenity would be rejected by 
Mill as unnecessary and unjustified restraints on the individual. 
The arguments posed by scholars such as Mill provide a firm foun­
dation for the conclusion that these provisions should be removed 
from our Criminal Code.
J.C. Dybikowski accepts Mill’s Liberal restraint guidelines 
and emphasizes that the onus for imposing restraints should be 
on the advocates thereof. He suggests that pornography has been 
subject to an unfounded criticism of presumed harm, thus placing 
the onus on the wrong party. Not only does he criticize the fact 
that the law is based on defrauded reasoning, he also suggests that 
obscenity may serve a healthy purpose.
I have suggested that obscenity may be positively valuable in a num­
ber o f ways; through 'ts contribution to self-knowledge about our sexual 
nature; through its release of the pressures o f sexual anxiety or guilt; 
and through the opportunities it offers for the imagination, as distinct 
from the actual, enactm ent of our sexual fantasies.
The protection of society, considered by Mill as the only 
justification for a law, does not appear to provide a sufficient 
justification for our obscenity law. Any danger of corrupting those 
susceptible is far outweighed by the need for our society to recog­
nize individual freedom and strive for sexual maturity.
84 Harvard Classics, #25, J.S. Mill, P.F. Collier & Son, New York.
85 Law, Liberty & Obscenity (1972), U.B.C.L. Rev. 33. at p. 54.
